Supreme Court, U.S.
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No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the State Bar and Georgia Supreme Court can summarily without a hearing and opportunity to be heard, disbar Petitioner based on her resignation from the Federal Court in the Southern District of Georgia in violation of the 5th and 14th amend, and thereby deprive her of her property right and license to practice law?

II. Whether the State Bar and Georgia Supreme Court violated Petitioner's right to due process and equal protection by disbarring her when two white male lawyers who were suspended from the same Federal Court were not disciplined by the State Bar of Georgia?

III. Whether the State Bar of Georgia can disbar Petitioner without a jury trial and should it be disband for violating Petitioner's constitutional right by denying a jury trial as promulgated by the Georgia legislation in 1963 and mandated by statute (O.C. G. A.15-19-32)?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioner in this case is JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS, a former member of the State Bar of Georgia.

The Respondents are the State Bar of Georgia and the Supreme Court of Georgia.

A corporate disclosure statement is not required pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States[1] because there is no petitioner herein that is a nongovernmental corporation.

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[1] All references to rules in this petition are to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, and therefore will be made hereinafter by reference to the number of the rule only, e.g., "Rule 29.6".

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Supreme Court of Georgia issued an Order disbarring Petitioner on February 16, 2004 and denied a rehearing on March 18, 2004.

JURISDICTION

Title 28 USC 1257 confers jurisdiction upon the Court to decide this matter on certiorari as it involves a final order from a state court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also holds that only the U. S. Supreme Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review the final order of the state court.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

I. Georgia Constitution

II. U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment

III. U. S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment

IV. U. S. Constitution, Eight Amendment

V. U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment

VI. Civil Rights Act AND VOTER'S RIGHT ACT

VII. 28 U. S. C. 1257

VIII. Official Code of Georgia

IX. Vol.1, Gen. Acts & Resolutions, no. 35, (Senate Bill 62), Ga. Laws, 1963 Session

STATEMENT

Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution the State cannot take Petitioner's right to practice law without a hearing when it contravenes due process. In the case before the court there has been an inconsistent and disparate application of discipline as it pertains to Petitioner. Petitioner, a Black female was disbarred when two white male lawyers who were suspended by the same Federal District Court were not disciplined by the State Bar. The granting of Certiorari is critical because it involves the taking of a valuable property right without notice and a hearing and the actions surrounding Petitioner's disbarment place a chilling effect on the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Act.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a Black Female who served her country as an Army Major Military Intelligence (Airborne) Officer for over 23 years (active and reserve) and practiced law in the State of Georgia for approximately 12 years prior to being disbarred February 16, 2004. She ran for U. S. Congress for the first Congressional District of Georgia in 2000 and garnered over 70,000 votes. Shortly after the election in 2001 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division issued a show cause order as to why she should not be disciplined. Petitioner submitted her resignation to the Federal Court because she was unable to defend herself due to a life threatening illness (Lupus) which had attacked brain cells and whiles taking numerous medications. Petitioner submitted information which proved her

severe medical condition, having been treated at the Veteran's Hospital over thirty 30 times in 2001. In fact the Petitioner was on bed rest by order of a doctor the day of the show cause but was ordered to appear in court.

The proceedings in Federal Court went beyond all bounds of human decency. The Court and the U.S. Attorney selectively prosecuted Petitioner by pulling cases that had been closed for six years or more or sanctions paid in the case. Other Attorneys practicing in Federal Court was not treated in the same manner as Petitioner. The U. S. Attorney intimidated former clients against the interest of Petitioner and told them to file lawsuits against her. Documents from the Federal Court proceedings also stated that Petitioner was an African American Female and that she had run for U. S. Congress as a Democrat against Republican Jack Kingston during the 2000 election.

The Federal Court refused the resignation Petitioner submitted however she was forced to sign the one they had prepared. The U. S. Attorney knew their documents contained false information but forced Petitioner to sign it. The news media was called in on the day of the show cause hearing but Petitioner resigned instead of having a hearing. The show cause and the resulting disbarment of Petitioner became political and was highly publicized on television, newspaper, radio and internet. As a result of the media blitz, Petitioner lost most of her business; her good reputation in the community and hurt her children that she was raising as a single parent. The Savannah Morning News on several occasions during the State Bar proceedings ran articles or cartoons about

Petitioner to her detriment. In fact the Savannah Morning News and not the State Bar or the Supreme Court of Georgia called Petitioner on February 16, 2004 and told her she was disbarred.

The Savannah Morning News along with the U. S. Attorney's Office forwarded Petitioner's resignation from Federal Court to the State Bar of Georgia. As a result and as provided by the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Petitioner after she resigned from the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in May 2001. Petitioner timely responded to all pleadings filed by the State Bar during their investigation. It should be noted that the clients did not file charges against Petitioner in Federal Court or with the State Bar in 2001, nor was anyone harmed by any of Petitioner's actions. In 1998, the State Bar of Georgia dismissed a case against Petitioner filed by a former client and indicated that she had not violated any rules, yet the bar used that same case against Petitioner in 2004 to disbar her. The State Bar of Georgia used the Reciprocal Disciple Rule 9.4 to disbar Petitioner without a hearing in spite of the fact that Petitioner had no prior disciplines and had won the Chief Justice Award for Professionalism, Pro Bono Award and numerous community awards.

The State Bar filed a motion for summary judgment December 10, 2001 and shortly thereafter, the first Special Master recused himself from the proceedings. A successor Special Master was appointed on or about May 6, 2002. An objection to the appointment of the successor Special Master was filed due to the fact that the Special Master and Petitioner resided in the same county. The Georgia Supreme

Court over the Petitioner's objections kept the Special Master in violation of Bar Rule 4-209. The Special Master was biased from the onset of the case since his firm is personal friends with Congressman Jack Kingston.

Petitioner timely filed a demand for jury trial on December 6, 2001; October 2, 2002 and a Renewed Motion for Jury Trial on July 25, 2003 pursuant to O.C.G. A. 15-19-32. On November 22, 2002 the Supreme court denied Respondent the right to a jury trial prior to the issuance of the grant of Summary Judgment. Petitioner also requested hearings and Oral arguments throughout the entire disciplinary proceedings but was denied due process and equal protection. On May 14, 2003 without notice and a right to be heard the Special Master granted the State Bar's Motion for Summary Judgment and recommended that Petitioner be disbarred or suspended until she was re-admitted to the Federal Court for the Southern District of Georgia. A Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Rules and Law and a Request for Oral Argument on said motion was filed by Petitioner on October 1, 2003. This Motion was never ruled on by the Special Master and is still pending.

Petitioner petitioned the Review Panel for an evidentiary hearing but was also denied. The Review Panel also recommended that Petitioner be disbarred without a hearing or right to be heard. Yet, the Supreme Court of Georgia Disbarred Respondent on February 16, 2004 without disposing of all pending motions and the right to be heard. Petitioner never had a hearing on the underlying charges in Federal Court or an evidentiary hearing in State Court. She had no

notice that the resignation from Federal Court would be treated as a disbarment until after she had resigned and the investigation initiated by the State Bar. Her right to due process and equal protection of the law was violated and a valuable property right to practice her profession taken without the opportunity to be heard and to clear her name (liberty interest violation).

The public was harmed by the disbarment of Petitioner and have lost confidence in the justice system. The disbarment of Petitioner is perceived by the Public as unfair, unjustified and a political attack against her to send a message to Black Americans, "that you better not run for certain political offices or you will be lynched like JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS". Two white male attorneys were suspended from the Federal Court but the State Bar did not seek to discipline them, yet Petitioner was disbarred. The Civil Rights and Voters Rights acts were implemented to enforce equal protection for all people including Black Americans to seek their profession, be treated the same as other races and run for any political office and vote for the candidates of their choice. Petitioner brokered the cause of the poor, the oppressed, the disenfranchised regardless of race, creed, color or national origin and oftentimes without compensation. She served her country to protect the right to life, liberty, property and equal protection for all people, but these very basic and important rights were denied her.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Supreme Court of Georgia has been in serious conflict over the disparity in Attorney

discipline. Two white male attorneys were suspended from the Federal Court for the Southern District of Georgia but the state Bar did not seek to discipline them, yet Petitioner was disbarred after she resigned. In Re Kennedy, 266 Ga 249, 466 S.E. 2d 1, 1996, there was no evidentiary hearing and improper notice of the charges. The attorney even made several admissions against his interest but the court refused to disbar him. The Petitioner was not given proper notice of the charges against her. In the formal complaint of October 15, 2001, Petitioner was alleged to have violated Rule 9.4. Yet, in the disbarment order dated February 16, 2004, it states that Petitioner was disbarred for violating Rules 1.3, 3.3(a)(1); Standards 4; 44; and 45(b) of bar Rules 102 (d). These charges were not part of the charges in the Formal Complaint therefore Petitioner was without notice and right to be heard.

Courts have consistently determined that the primary purpose of disciplining lawyers was to protect the public. However, the liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution 14th amendment may not be interfered with under the guise of protecting the public.

Petitioner's right to practice law was taken under the guise of protecting the public. However, the public was hurt by the taking of Petitioner's license and not helped. The public views the disbarment of Petitioner as political and violation of Civil Rights.

The order from the Federal Court was not binding on the state. A lawyer is into a into federal court by way of a state court, but is not automatically sent out of federal court by the same route, since the federal and state court have autonomous control over

their respective officers, 7 AM Jur 2d Attorneys At Law 40. Disbarment is a very serious matter and the accused must have ample opportunity to show why they should not be disbarred. The ultimate disciplinary sanction that can be levied upon an attorney, brings with it profoundly severe repercussions. The Seventh Circuit described it best, In Re Fischer, "the disbarment of an attorney is the destruction of his professional life, his character, and his livelihood. The Court should, therefore disbar in moderation. A removal of an attorney from practice for a period of years entails the complete loss of a clientele with its consequent uphill road of patient waiting to again re-establish himself in the eyes of the public, in the good graces of the courts and his fellow lawyer. In the meantime, his income and livelihood have ceased to exists." The U. S. Supreme Court has held that the personal interest in reputation is included within the Constitutional protection of liberty afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Deprivation of the kind that occurs in an attorney's disbarment, and the accompanying "stigmatization," are infringements upon liberty interests. The U. S. Supreme Court has clearly stated that disbarment, a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer is quasi-criminal in nature, entitles the attorney to procedural due process. The State and Federal Court proceedings were so infirm that Petitioner was denied due process and equal protection of the law. Petitioner's right to practice law is a valuable property right protected by the 14th amendment and which cannot be taken away without due process of law, Conway v. State Bar (CA 1989); Weiner v. Fulton County (Ga, App. 1966) 148 S. E. 2d. The right to follow a profession is a property right. Muse V. Connell, 62 Ga.App. 296, 303, (8 S E 2d 100).

Specifically the right to practice law has been held to be a property right within the meaning of due process and equal protection provision of the 14th amendment. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (77SC 752, 1 LE 2d796). In Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 US 390, 1923 the court reversed a conviction for Meyer a teacher, who taught foreign language to young children. The court reversed, holding that the statute was arbitrary and that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th amendment protected a teacher's right to teach (guaranteed liberty interest). Petitioner's right to practice law is within the liberty guaranteed under the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

In determining the disciplinary sanction to be imposed against an attorney, the U.S. Supreme Court considers the duty violated, lawyer's mental state, the injury caused and the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Cincinnati Bar Association v. Reisenfield, 701 NE 2d 973 (1998). In Petitioner's case before this court, it must be noted that she was suffering from a life threatening disease (lupus) which had attacked several organs of her body primarily the brain; that the clients did not complain to the state bar but that the U. S. Attorney's office reviewed cases that Petitioner had filed in Federal Court some dating back to 1995 (sanctions paid) and intimidated former clients to speak against her interest in Federal Court.

The State Bar Rule 9.4 under which Petitioner was disbarred did not proscribe her actions because it did not state that a resignation from Federal District Court was tantamount to a disbarment. She did not have notice that a resignation in Federal Court would

subject her to the State Bar of Georgia Rule 9.4 Reciprocal Discipline thus violating her right to due process and equal protection. Petitioner was never granted a hearing on the merits of the case but was summarily disbarred. All courts possess the authority to disbar an attorney, but such power can only be exercised where there has been such misconduct on the part of the attorney that shows they are unfit to practice law. An attorney has a Constitutional right to practice their profession and can only be deprived of it for misconduct after she is afforded an opportunity to be heard. Ex Parte Robinson 86 US 508, 1874. In the Matter of Kennedy, 466 S. E. 2d 1, the court dismissed part of the charges against him because he did not have notice. The selective prosecution of and denial of due process for Petitioner is akin to the attack on the Honorable Janice Brown of the California Supreme Court. See, Due Process Denied; Justice Brown is Being Selectively Prosecuted, The Washington Times, Nov. 24, 2003. Page A23. See, Sacher v Association of the Bar of the City of NY et al., 347 US 388; 74 S. Ct. 569, April 5, 1954. The attorney challenged a judgment of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which disbarred him after he had been convicted in a NY District Court for contempt. The court after reviewing the entire record, set aside as unnecessarily severe, and remanded the case. The disbarment was an abuse of discretion and exceeding the bounds of fair discretion. Petitioner's disbarment was an arbitrary action and a clear abuse of discretion by the State Supreme Court of Georgia. State courts are not bound by standards of professional conduct prescribed or enforced by the Federal courts, they are separate entities. The admission to the bar of a Federal Court is often dependent on admission to a State court. 32 Am

Jur 2d Federal Courts 638. But the admission to a state court is not dependent on admission to a Federal Court. Federal Court admission is not a Prerequisite to admission to a state court. In fact many attorneys choose not to be admitted to Federal court. An Attorney's disbarment by a state court does not automatically lead to the attorney's disbarment by a federal court, since each court has the duty to regulate members of its own bar. An Attorney does not have to be a member of a Federal Court. See, In re Ruffalo, 390 US 544; Theard v. United States; In re Isserman, 345 US 286, a Federal Court disbarment was reversed as being too severe a punishment under the circumstances. In Re Noell, 93 F.2d 5, it was held that the state court order was not valid because there was no hearing r opportunity to be heard. The State and Federal Court proceedings were wanting in due process, see Selling v. Radford, 243 US 46, and In Re Ruffalo 370 F. 2d, at 449, the court looked at the Ohio proceeding to determine if there was any lack of due process. The case was reversed because the Petitoner was denied due process. Justice Edwards said "Such procedural violation of due process would never pass muster in any normal civil or criminal case. Theard v. U.S., 354 U. S. 278. The State Bar of Georgia had an obligation to determine for itself if the proceedings in Federal Court lacked due process and equal protection and whether the alleged conduct was so grievous that it warranted disbarment. This they failed to do, in fact the Special Master summarily recommended that the Petitioner be suspended or disbarred until she as re-admitted in Federal Court. The Special Master never provided Petitioner with a hearing thus violating her right to due process. Disbarment is designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the

lawyer. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511, 515, the court stated that he was entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice to the charge. Even the Supreme Court of the U.S. before disbarring an attorney determines whether disbarment by the State Court should be followed by disbarment in their court and whether "the State procedure from want of notice or opportunity to be heard was wanting in due process." Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46. In Petitioner's case the State Court failed to determine whether there was notice or opportunity to be heard and summarily disbarred Petitioner. The practice of law is not a matter of a state's grace; it is a constitutionally protected right.

The interpretation of Rule 9.4 against the Petitioner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth amendment of the U. S. Constitution. Georgia Bar Rules contains Rule9.4, which states in part: Disbarment or suspension by another jurisdiction is a ground for discipline in the State of Georgia. However, the Rule does not state that if an attorney resigns from another jurisdiction. This Rule appears to be vague, subjective, over broad and unconstitutional.

Reading of Bar Rule 9.4 as provided in the handbook distributed by the State Bar of Georgia does not indicate that an attorney will be disciplined for resigning from another Court in the same state. In the Matter of Eric Karlton Powell, 274 Ga. 89 548 S.E. 2d 615 (2001), a Georgia Attorney committed a crime in another state; plead guilty and surrendered his license thus triggering Rule 9.4. This case along with others proves that Rule 9.4 should not have been applied to

Petitioner's case. The new proposed Rule clearly indicates how vague, arbitrary and unconstitutional the current Rule was. This Rule contains vague and subjective language making it unconstitutional. It includes the acts of being disbarred or suspended from another jurisdiction as a violation, but it does not mention resigning from another jurisdiction. A Rule or Statute is interpreted on its face, it means what it says and is overbroad; subjective and vague if one adds language that is not included. Because any ultimate attorney discipline is a quasi-criminal punishment in character, any disciplinary rules used to impose a sanction on attorneys must be strictly construed resolving ambiguities in favor of the person charged. See, Matter of Thalheim, 853 F. 2d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 988). A resignation is not a disbarment or suspension. Due Process and equal protection demanded that Petitioner be given notice that a resignation in one jurisdiction is tantamount to disbarment. Notice was not provided to Petitioner before she resigned from the Federal Court, thus violating the U. S. and Georgia Constitution equal protection provisions. Of importance is the case of Mississippi Bar vs. Shah, the attorney never admitted any wrong doing, but only consented to an order of sanctions issued by the bankruptcy court. The dissenting justice in that case argued that Mississippi's reciprocal discipline rule includes the phrase "another jurisdiction," and that a federal court is not "another jurisdiction" under the rule because they have no power to determine if an attorney is fit to practice and exercise a license to practice law. A federal court may determine whether an attorney will practice before it, but that court neither has the power to take an attorney's license or to discipline an attorney for a violation of a state's rules of

professional responsibility. 25 J legal Prof 143, 2001, Reciprocal Discipline: Double Jeopardy or a States Right to Protect its Citizens? In the February, 2004 Georgia State Bar Journal, the State Bar of Georgia filed a Motion to Amend certain rules. On page 79 of the Journal, the State Bar proposed that the current Rule 9.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct be deleted in its entirety... Yet the State Bar used this same Rule that it deleted to disbar Petitioner. In the case of Bouie et al v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, the court held that no person should be disbarred when the rule is so vague as to deny due process. In Re Ruffalo, 390 US 544, 1968, the Attorney was deprived of due process because he did not know of the charge against him until after the proceedings started. Thus, the court reversed his disbarment because he was deprived of due process. The Petitioner did not know that the resignation would be viewed as a disbarment until after she had resigned from Federal Court and the State Bar of Georgia started an investigation against her. The disbarment of Petitioner because of a resignation in Federal court where one does not have to join to be a member of the state court subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of equal protection and due process.

The right to pursue one's livelihood was so critical that the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Conn v. Gabbert , 119 S Ct., 1998, to determine whether a prosecutor violated an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession when the prosecutor caused the attorney to be searched at the same time his client was testifying before a grand jury. It is apparent that the U. S. Supreme Court views an attorney's right to practice

their profession so important that they granted certiorari in the above case to determine if a fourteenth amendment violation had occurred. The court ultimately held the lawyer's right was not violated based on a brief interruption that occurred while he was searched and that his income, reputation, clientele, or professional qualifications were not adversely affected by the interruption. The court further stated that there was no evidence or allegation that his client was substantially prejudiced by what occurred. In Petition's case the denial of due process at every level of the disciplinary process caused a loss of income, tarnished reputation in the community, loss of clientele and professional qualifications and ultimately the end of a great career. Petitioner's right to practice her profession was adversely affected by the disbarment and the action by the State Supreme Court of Georgia and of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Petitioner's clients were also severely prejudiced by the court's action because now they have no one to broker their cause. Petition had performed a lot of Pro Bono work and received the Pro Bono Award from the State Bar of Georgia and Chief Justice Award on Professionalism from the Supreme Court of Georgia.

This court has held in a line of earlier cases that the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment, but a right which is nevertheless subject to reasonable government regulation. See, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889). These cases involve a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a calling, and not the brief interruption in the Conn's

case. A state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law for reasons that contravene the Due Process Clause, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N. M., 353 U. S. 232,(1957).

In the present case, the Petitioner had a right to a jury trial pursuant to O.C. G. A. 15-19-32, prior to any order of disbarment. The right to a jury trial is recognized in Georgia and such right to a trial by jury shall remain inviolate..... Ga Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I. The Georgia Legislature codified the Constitutional right to a jury trial. The legislative history of O.C.G.A. 15-19-32 which is the same history that created the unified State Bar of Georgia provides in part that it is: to provide for the right of a lawyer involved in any disbarment proceeding to elect to have any material issue of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the county of his residence.... Vol. I, Gen Acts and Resoultions, No. 35 (Senate Bill 62), Ga Laws, 1963 Session. Pursuant to Section 3 of the legislative history of the statute required as a condition precedent to the establishment of a unified bar or for the promulgation of rules to govern such unified bar, that any such rules must provide an attorney the right to a jury trial. All citizens of the State of Georgia are entitled to a jury trial including attorneys. Petitioner was denied this very important and critical right which violated her right to equal protection, due process and the Sixth amendment to the Constitution. Therefore the State Bar of Georgia must be disband for failure to abide by the condition precedent as outlined.

CONCLUSION

The constitutionality, vagueness and violation of State Law and the U. S. and Georgia Constitution, the taking of life, liberty and property without due process and equal protection was so blatant that it is imperative this court grant Petitioner's certiorari. This case has serious implications on the Civil Right and Voter's Right Acts for the public at large.

Respectfully submitted,

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(Any footnotes trail the end of each document)

S04Y0073

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

IN THE MATTER OF JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS.

February 16, 2004, Decided

COUNSEL: William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

Phillips & Kitchings, Richard D. Phillips, for Griggs.

JUDGES: All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., not participating.

OPINION: Per curiam.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board recommending that Respondent Joyce Marie Griggs be disbarred for her violations of Rules 1.3, 3.3 (a) (1), and 9.4; and Standards 4, 44, and 45 (b) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A violation of any of these rules is punishable by disbarment.

The above-stated disciplinary violations were presented in a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding brought pursuant to Rule 9.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct after Griggs was barred from practicing in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. In May 2003, the special master

granted the State Bar's motion for summary judgment based on the record of the district court disciplinary proceeding, which showed that, in response to a disciplinary proceeding commenced against her in district court, Griggs resigned from the bar of that court on May 9, 2001 and that on the same day, Griggs was barred by order of that court from practicing in the district court. The special master noted in his report that the district court disciplinary proceeding was commenced, in accordance with the court's local rules, by entry of a show cause order, which provided that Griggs made false representations to the federal district court about her actions as counsel or about her filings on behalf of her clients in various cases; that she abandoned her clients' cases by not timely filing complaints, motions, or briefs, by not responding to motions, and by not responding to court orders requiring her action to preserve her clients' claims and as a result, her clients' cases were dismissed; and that at other times, she made unwarranted or vexatious claims or defenses. The special master also noted that in her response to the show cause order, Griggs acknowledged that the factual averments in the order were true and correct.

We have reviewed the record in this case and agree with the special master and the Review Panel that Griggs should be disbarred for her violations of Rules 1.3, 3.3 (a) (1), and 9.4; and Standards 4, 44, and 45 (b) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. We note, in mitigation of discipline, that Griggs had no prior disciplinary record, but, in aggravation of discipline, that the case included a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. Accordingly, Griggs hereby is disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Georgia. She is reminded

of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c). All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., not participating.

Case No. S04Y0073

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

IN THE MATTER OF JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS.

Atlanta, March 19, 2004

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

IN THE MATTER OF JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS

Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed in this case, it is ordered that it be hereby denied.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., not participating.

I hereby certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

Sherie M. Welch, Clerk
Clerk's Office, Atlanta
Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

Chapter for which a penalty is not specifically proved, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

Section 16. Said Code Chapter is further amended by adding thereto two (2) new Code sections to be know as section 84-9969 and section 84-9970 and to read as follows:

"84-9969. Any person operating or managing a barber shop or barber school or college that employs a person not possessing a license as provided in this Chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

"84-9970. Any person operating or managing a barber shop or barber school or college engaging in other occupation on Sunday shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

Section 17. This Act shall become effective on May 1, 196i.

Section 18. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed.

Approved March 11, 1963.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIA

No. 85 (Senate Bill No. 62).

An Act to authorize the Supreme Court of Georgia to establish, as an administrative arm of the Court, a unified, self-governing bar association to be know as the "State Bar of Georgia" composed of all persons now or

hereafter licensed to practice law in this State; to provide for the adoption of rules an regulations by the Supreme Court for the organization an government of the unified bar and to define the rights, duties and obligations for the members therein including the payment of a reasonable license fee and to otherwise regulate and govern the practice of law in this State; to provide for the right of a lawyer involved in any disbarment proceeding to elect to have any material issue of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the country of his residence; to provide the method of making applications to the Supreme Court for the establishing and amending rules and regulations governing the same; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia:

Section 1. In recognition of the fact that lawyers are officers of the courts of this state; that they have the exclusive right to practice law and represent members of the public in connection with their legal affairs; that they are charged with important responsibilities in connection with the administration of justice both in and out of the courts; and that for the reasons a strong legal profession is in the public interest, the Supreme Court of this State shall be authorized, upon a petition presented by the Georgia Bar Association, to establish, as an administrative arm of the court, a unified self-governing bar association to be know as the "State Bar of Georgia" composed of all persons now or hereafter licensed to practice law in this State.

Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have the authority by appropriate orders, upon recommendation initially made by the Georgia Bar Association and after the

establishment of the unified State Bar, upon recommendation of the unified State Bar, as herein set out to adopt rules an regulations for the organization and government of the unified State Bar an to define the rights, duties and obligations of the members therein including the payment of a reasonable license fee and otherwise regulate and govern the practice of law in this State, to the end that such unified State Bar shall promote the best interest of the public by maintaining high standards of conduct in the legal profession and by aiding in the efficient administration of justice.

Section 8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Supreme Court shall not grant an application for the establishment of such unified State Bar nor at any time approve rules therefore, unless such rules shall provided that before a final order of any nature or any judgment or disbarment is entered, the lawyer involved may elect to have any material issues of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the county of his residence.

Section 4. Upon the presentation of a petition by the Georgia Bar Association to the Supreme Court for the establishment of a unified self-governing State Bar, the Georgia State Bar Association as soon thereafter as may be ordered by the Court, shall submit to the Court proposed rules and regulations relating to the organization and government of the unified State Bar and to define the rights, duties and obligations of the members therein including the payment of a reasonable license fee and otherwise governing and regulating the practice of law in the State, and a copy of said application, together with said proposed rules and regulations, shall be furnished to each member of the

Georgia Bar Association and shall be made available to lawyers licensed to practice law in the State who are not members of the Georgia Bar Association. The Supreme Court shall set down for public hearing the matter of the granting of the application and the adoption of such proposed rules and regulations and any lawyer or other person interested may appear in person or by brief either for the purpose of supporting or opposing the granting of the application or supporting or opposing the granting of the application or supporting or opposing the proposed rules and regulations. The Supreme Court in initially establishing such State Bar, shall not adopt any rule or regulation which has not been approved by the Georgia Bar Association.

Section 5. Upon the establishment of the "State Bar of Georgia" and the adoption of the initial rules and regulations governing such organization, such rules and regulations may be amended only upon recommendations of the "State Bar of Georgia" under such rules and proceedings as shall be prescribed by the Court.

Section 6. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed.

Approved March 11, 1963.

CODE OF GEORGIA

Title 15. Courts

Chapter 19. Attorneys

Article 2. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA

Currently through 2002 Legislative Session

§ 15-19-32. Option Of Jury Trial Prior To Final Order Or Disbarment.

The rules and regulations governing the unified state bar shall provide that before a final order of any nature or any judgment of disbarment is entered the attorney involved may elect to have any material issues of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the county of his residence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF:
JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS,
STATE BAR NO. 312109,
RESPONDENT.

SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO S02YO182
STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD
DOCKET NO 4239

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER

Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-217, the Special Master, James W. Smith, files the following report:

Procedural Background

This is a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding brought pursuant to Rule 9.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The special master granted the State Bar's motion for summary judgment based on the record of the disciplinary proceeding brought against Respondent in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Findings of Fact

Respondent has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 1992 and is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, and a Special Master properly designated by the Supreme

Court of Georgia. Answer, paragraph 1. Respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

The formal complaint charges Respondent with violating Rule 9.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The "record of disbarment or suspension" in the federal court is "conclusive evidence" in this disciplinary proceeding. Rule 9.4(b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The record of the district court's proceeding shows that, in response to a disciplinary proceeding commenced against her in the district court, Respondent resigned from the bar of that court on May 9, 2001. State Bar's Exhibits A and B. Respondent was then barred by order of that court of the same date from practicing in the federal court. State Bar's Exhibit C.

The federal court disciplinary proceeding was commenced by entry of a show cause order in accordance with the court's local rules.fn1 State Bar's Exhibit A (the show cause order). As detailed in the show cause order, Respondent made false representations to the federal district court about her actions as counsel or about her filings on behalf of her clients in various cases. State Bar's Exhibit A, pages 1, 3, and 5. At other times, Respondent abandoned her clients' cases by not timely filing complaints, motions or briefs, not responding to motions, or not responding to court orders requiring her action to preserve her clients' claims. As a result, Respondent's clients' cases were dismissed, often with fees or expenses assessed against her for dilatory actions or being completely unresponsive. State Bar's Exhibit A, pages 4, 6, 7, and 9. At still other times, she made unwarranted or vexatious claims or defenses. State Bar's Exhibit A, pages 1, 2, and 4.

Respondent did timely respond to the federal court's show cause order in a written filing signed by her and her counsel. State Bar's Exhibit B. In her response to the show cause order, she "acknowledg[ed] that the factual averments in the Show Cause Order of April 13, 2001, are true and correct." State Bar's Exhibit B, page 1.

Given her concession about the facts underlying the disciplinary proceedings, and her resignation, she was barred by order from practice in the federal court. State Bar's Exhibit C. By her own agreement, she cannot even apply for readmission for 5 years. State Bar's Exhibit B, page 1.

Subsequent to the district court's order and the filing of this reciprocal disciplinary proceeding, Respondent sought from the district court leave to withdraw her disciplinary resignation. See, generally, the State Bar's supplement to the record of the United States district court's disciplinary proceedings (State Bar's Exhibits D, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K) filed May 20, 2002, and the State Bar's second supplement to the record of the United States district court's disciplinary proceedings (State Bar's Exhibits L, M, and N) filed October 14, 2002. The district court denied Respondent's request in an order entered March 25, 2002. See State Bar's Exhibit H. The district court reaffirmed the denial of Respondent's request in an order entered April 16, 2002. See State Bar's Exhibit K.

Respondent then sought review of the district court's orders in an appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit. The appeals court, in a decision entered and filed October 4, 2002, rejected Respondent's appeal and affirmed the order of the

district court suspending her from the practice of law in the district court. See State Bar's Exhibit N. Respondent did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the 11th Circuit's decision. Thus, the district court's disciplinary order on which this reciprocal discipline case is based continues in effect and remains "a ground for discipline in the State of Georgia." Rule 9.4(a), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct; State Bar's Exhibit C.

Conclusions of Law

The Special Master concludes that Respondent violated Rule 9.4(a) of the Georgia Rules o£ Professional Misconduct.

The summary of Respondent's misconduct contained in the federal court's show cause order catalogs a pattern of misconduct that would be the basis for disbarment in Georgia. Moreover, Respondent admits the truth of this pattern of misconduct. Respondent made false representations to the federal court. Making a false representation violates Standards 4 and 45(b), and Rule 3.3(a)(1).fn2 Violation of either of those disciplinary rules is a basis for disbarment. In other instances, Respondent abandoned her clients' cases. Abandonment violates Standard 44 and Rule 1.3.fn3 Violation of either of those disciplinary rules is a basis for disbarment.fn4

On account of her resignation and admissions of misconduct, the federal court disbarred Respondent. Respondent is subject to discipline in this court since "[d]isbarment or suspension by another jurisdiction is a ground for discipline in the State of Georgia." Rule 9.4. As noted in Comment 3 of the rule, "the word

'jurisdiction' means other states, territories, countries, and federal courts." Because Respondent is barred from the practice of law in the federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Georgia can now discipline her.

The Supreme Court relies on the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of the American Bar Association for guidance in determining punishments in disciplinary cases. In the Matter of Jack D. Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653, 470 S. E. 2d 323 (1996). The ABA standards look, first, to the infractions proven in a pending disciplinary case and, second, to any aggravating and mitigating factors. Violation of rule 9.4 may be punished by disbarment. Therefore, disposition of this disciplinary proceeding involves deciding whether disbarment or some lesser punishment is proper in light of any aggravating or mitigating factors.

According to the ABA standards, "[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 6.11 (1991 edition). Respondent made false statements to the federal court and, as the federal court found, caused injury to the parties and the judicial process. State Bar's Exhibit A, pages 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a

legal proceeding." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 6.21 (1991 edition). Respondent violated the federal court's orders and, as the federal court found, caused injury to the parties and interfered with legal proceedings. State Bar's Exhibit A, pages 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

Considerations of aggravating and mitigating factors buttress the appropriateness of disbarment. "After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.1 (1991 edition). The aggravating factors in this case include a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standards 9.22 (c), (d) and (i) (1991 edition). The federal court's show cause order describes a litany of professional misconduct, all of which Respondent admits is true. Respondent has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 1992 and thus has substantial experience in the practice of law.

Respondent has no prior disciplinary record, a mitigating factor. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.32(a) (1991 edition). However, that factor is effectively nullified by the principle that she should not be able to practice in Georgia after disbarment by the federal court. In the Matter of Eric Karlton Powell, supra at 90.

Alternatively, and at a minimum, Respondent should be suspended indefinitely. Where a Georgia lawyer is disbarred in another jurisdiction, and even though the lawyer intends to seek reinstatement in the other jurisdiction, the lawyer must still be suspended in

Georgia. The lawyer is suspended indefinitely in Georgia until the lawyer "appl[ies] for and [is] reinstated to practice law in the" other jurisdiction, "or appl[ies] for and [is] reinstated to practice law in Georgia" pursuant to Georgia's reinstatement rule. In the Matter of James J. Clinton, 272 Ga. 11, 12, 525 S. E. 2d 688 (2000).

In her resignation from the bar of the federal court, Respondent "agrees that she will not apply for readmission to [the federal court's] Bar for a period of five years." State Bar's Exhibit B, page 1. Similarly, a lawyer disbarred by the Supreme Court of Georgia may not apply for readmission until "five years after the date of the court order of disbarment or the court order accepting the surrender of license." Part A, Section 11(a), Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law. Respondent might seek, and be granted, readmission to the federal court. Thus, as in Clinton, Respondent's suspension in Georgia should "end [only] upon entry of an order by this Court acknowledging the [federal court] order reinstating [her]." In the Matter of James J. Clinton, supra at 13.

Respondent violated Rule 9.4 when she was disbarred from practicing before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Adhering to the standards for imposing lawyer sanctions adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Respondent should be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Georgia until the federal court readmits her.

Recommendation of Discipline

Considering the three aggravating factors and the one mitigating factor, disbarment, as defined in Bar Rule 4-102(b)(1), is the appropriate discipline in this case.

Alternatively, an indefinite suspension as defined in Bar Rule 4-102(b)(2), to last until Respondent is readmitted to the federal court, is a minimally acceptable sanction.

Directions to Clerk

The clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall file this report and the complete record of this proceeding in accordance with Bar Rule 4-217(c).

This 14th day of May 2003.

James W. Smith
Special Master

FOOTNOTES

fn1 Local Rule 83.5 provides:

(a) Any attorney ... may for good cause shown, and after an opportunity has been given him to be heard, be disbarred, suspended from practice for a definite time, reprimanded, or subjected to such other discipline as the Court may deem proper.

(e) The notice of hearing for any proceeding to be conducted under subparagraph (a) of this Rule shall include the specifications of charges and complaints against the attorney being considered by the Court for disciplinary action, and the time by which a response thereto shall be made.

fn2 Standard 4 provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in professional misconduct involving fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation. A

violation of his standard may be punished by disbarment.

Standard 45(b) provides:

In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:

(b) knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
A violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.

Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.
The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

fn3Standard 44 provides:

A lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of his client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to him.
A violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.

Rule 1.3 provides:

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. reasonable diligence as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.

The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.

fn4 Respondent's other misconduct included making unwarranted or vexatious claims or defenses. Stare Bar's Exhibit A, page 4. See Rule 3.1(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such conduct alone would only be punishable by a public reprimand, but it can be an aggravating factor warranting a more severe punishment. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.22(d) (multiple offenses).

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA

IN THE MATTER OF:
JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS,
STATE BAR NO. 312109,
RESPONDENT.

DOCKET NO S02YO182

STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD
DOCKET NO 4239

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER

I hereby certify that I served a copy of the Report of the Special Master by mail on the persons listed and at the addresses stated:

Jonathan Hewett, State Bar of Georgia, 104 Marietta Street, N. W., Atlanta, GA. 30303:and

Joyce Marie Griggs, 2875 Highway 80 W., Savannah, GA 31408.
*

On this 14th day of May, 2003.

James W. Smith
Special Master

FOOTNOTES

*Richard D. Phillips
P. 0. Box 69
Ludowici, Georgia 31316-0069

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

IN RE: JOYCE M. GRIGGS

MISC. NO. 401-19

SHOW CAUSE ORDER OF
APRIL 13, 2001

COMES NOW, the Respondent, JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS, and submits her resignation from the Bar of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, including the Bankruptcy Court and all other components of the federal courts of this District, with the acknowledgment that the factual averments in the Show Cause Order of April 13, 2001, are true and correct. Respondent agrees that she will not apply for readmission to this Bar for a period of five years, and accepts that any readmission may be subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions as the Chief Judge of the Court may then require.

With regard to cases pending in this Court, and its components, including the Bankruptcy Court, Respondent will within ten (10) days submit a complete listing of all cases pending in District Court and Bankruptcy Court, and within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, with the approval of the client, shall submit to the Court, the names of successor counsel and shall within that same thirty (30) day period deliver all files pertaining to the case to successor counsel.

Respondent acknowledges that this withdrawal does not extinguish her obligation to comply with all orders and sanctions previously imposed by this Court.

This 9th day of May, 2001.

Diane Morrell-McLeod
Counsel for Respondent

Joyce M. Griggs
Respondent

I approve and accept the above resignation, and all of its stipulations. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.5 (f), 1 find the interests of justice require that this resignation be filed in open court and not placed under seal.

This 9th day of May, 2001.

Dudley H. Bowen, Jr.
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Southern District of Georgia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

IN RE: JOYCE M. GRIGGS
STATE BAR NO. 312109

MISC. NO. 401-019

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

This Order is entered pursuant to the resignation from the bar of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia of Joyce M. Griggs, tendered on May 8, 2001. Further, this Court adopts any and all terms and conditions of Ms. Griggs, resignation, which is appended hereto, and by such reference, made a part hereof.

Upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the name of the above-captioned attorney at law be hereby stricken and deleted from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice law before this Court. It is further ORDERED that Ms. Joyce M. Griggs shall hereafter make no pretense or attempt to practice law before this Court, nor shall she undertake any course of conduct or action to create the appearance or illusion of any authority to practice law before this Court.

Should Ms. Griggs seek readmission to the bar of this district, the application shall be directed to the Chief judge and shall further state the grounds upon which her claim of fitness for such bar admission is based.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this 9th day of May, 2001.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF:
JOYCE MARIE GRIGGS
RESPONDENT

MISC NO. 401-19

PETITION FOR CONSIDERATION TO
SHOW CAUSE HEARING

COMES NOW the Joyce Marie Griggs, Respondent in the above-styled matter and submits to this Honorable Court her Petition for Consideration and states to this court:

I.
Law Office Management

The Respondent will submit her law office to law office practice management and audit as offered through the State Bar of Georgia. The Respondent will contact the State Bar of Georgia and pay the required costs within ten (10) days of approval of this petition.

II.
Continuing Legal Education

The Respondent will take legal education courses as they become available within the next twelve (12) months In the areas of Bankruptcy, Federal Criminal Litigation, and Federal Civil Litigation.

III.
Bankruptcy

The Respondent will serve as second to Attorney Stanford Hines for the next six (6) months.

IV.
Federal Civil Practice

The Respondent agrees to serve as second in any civil case before this Court for a period of six (6) months.
Respectfully Submitted, this day of , 2001.

DISABILITY STATUS

Mrs. Joyce Griggs was seen at Immediate Med on 5-8-01 for illness.

PATIENT WAS ADVISED TO:
No work for 4 days

David M. Nelson M. D.

STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Samuel Bacon
P 0. Box 171
AIIenhurst, GA 31301

Re: Grievance filed against Ms. Joyce Marie Griggs, Bar# 312 109
2875 Hwy 80, . Savannah, GA 31408

Dear Mr. Bacon:

I have carefully reviewed all of the correspondence and documents in your file regarding your grievance against the above-referenced attorney. At this time, I must inform you that the conduct alleged in your grievance does not fall within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia.

The State Bar of Georgia does not have the authority to discipline lawyers for the pretrial or trial strategies they use. Although you allege that this attorney was not as "effective" as you would have liked, the available evidence is insufficient to show willful misconduct. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are not properly brought before the Office of the General Counsel

Accordingly, this office will take no further action on this matter. Thank you for your cooperation during this informal investigation.

Sincerely,
Jacalyn L Scott
Grievance Counsel

THE PRO BONO PROJECT

of the

STATE BAR OF GEORGIA

recognizes

Joyce Marie Griggs

for outstanding public service in providing legal representation
to the low income citizens of Georgia.

This 31st day of December, 2001

President, State Bar of Georgia

Director, Pro Bono Project

CERTIFICATE OF ACHIEVEMENT FOR OUTSTANDING COMMUNITY SERVICE

presented by

The Community Service Task Force
Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism
State Bar of Georgia

presented to

JOYCE M. GRIGGS

In grateful recognition of significant service to the community and to the profession of law in advancing the mission of the Community Service Task Force: To encourage, support, and recognize within the profession the tradition that all lawyers perform community service and measure their success in ways other than just financial gain.

2000

Robert Benham

Robert Benham
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of Georgia

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